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Uneven and combined independence of social media in the Middle East:
Technology, symbolic production and unproductive labor

Gholam Khiabany
A year and a half after the Iranian uprising in 2009, the unprecedented popular revolts in several Arab countries at the beginning of 2011 provided some of the most evocative moments when power met its opposite, in decisive and surprising ways. In a matter of weeks, some of the most powerful hereditary/republican regimes in the region, such as those in Tunisia and Egypt, crumbled under relentless pressure and opposition from highly mediated ‘street politics’ that shook the foundations of authoritarian and repressive rule, undermining hegemonic structures and configurations of power within nation states and between nations. Technology, as in the case of Iranian uprising, emerged as one of the main explanations on offer to make sense of this new wave of revolts against tyranny. Outside of the region, the big media players, faced with political and financial obstacles, relied on vast amounts of ’raw material’ (images, sounds, texts) to construct stories and theories of revolutions and of technologies. If sophisticated monitoring of the internet in Iran and the Arab World, alongside ‘filtering,’ remained major obstacles for symbolic producers/activists in the region, the filter of credibility and journalistic validation of Western Big Media proved to be another site of struggle over the legitimacy of the monopoly of meaning. In addition, according to some commentators, social media users are exploited to enrich big media companies in the west.
James Bennett’s introduction in this collection provides an overview of various definitions of and approaches to media independence. As he demonstrates, the label of independent (and we might add the practice and applications of it) remains problematic and contradictory. In the first place the issue of independence always begs the question of independent from and in relation to what? The answer, depending on whether the term is defined on the basis of structure (horizontal/vertical; participatory/hierarchical); funding (commercial/public); political (left/right, state/commercial); etc, varies. To this we add the problems of precise definition of public and private; political and commercial; alternative and mainstream and so on. Again as Bennett suggests, the criteria listed under the label of independent and dependent can be, and indeed are, contradictory. Conflations of independence with the alternative also raise the question—alternative to what? Linked to this, and rather crucial to any discussion about independent media and their perceived role in societal change, is the idea of praxis. On this issue it is worth remembering the distinction that Raymond Williams made between alternative and oppositional. “There is a simple theoretical distinction between alternative and oppositional, that is to say between someone who simply finds a different way to live and wishes to be left alone with it, and someone who finds a different way to live and wants to change society in its light” (2005: 41-42). 
This chapter examines these issues further by assessing the contradictions of production and distribution of information in the Middle East. I focus on Iran, where cyberspace came to be seen as an independent, unified and un-segmented site of resistance. The first part of this chapter reviews the recent discussion about user generated content and digital labor that posits that user generated content is a form of exploited free labor. However, it will be argued that while the focus on ‘labor’ is crucial for any meaningful assessment of the cultural industries, seeing the producers of user-generated content as ‘free labor’ and as exploited workers simply ignores the varying composition of work, production, and control in social media environments. The chapter then examines the case of the Middle East and argues that the power of bloggers as ‘independent producers’ is enhanced and constrained by a variety of factors. This chapter takes a broader comparative frame, beyond technology, to explore the issue of dependency and unequal of division of labor in our neoliberal  time. 
The production of unproductive labor
The whole world appears to be on the move. Indeed the recent period has seen an explosion of participatory politics around the globe, from the uprising in Iran, to the so-called ’Arab spring’ movements of 2011, to Occupy activities to events in Greece, Spain, Turkey and Brazil. The whole world, also, appears to be watching the very same events. Much of the hype about the ‘movement’ and its audio-visual manifestation, has been about the power of new and social media. These movements and uprisings have had in common the objection to the uneven distribution of political and material resources. They have been, in one way or another, a response to the theft of ‘abundance’ in the era which has been characterized supposedly by the “logic of abundance ” (Vercellone 2007). What has abounded, however, have been images and texts—photos of demonstrations and short video clips often taken from mobile phones and uploaded to YouTube and mash-ups of photographs made into video, accompanied by music. The pictures and films of fallen heroes, police brutality and the bravery of activists have appeared on YouTube, Facebook and blogs in a number of different forms, and accompanied by different musical scores. The wide range of media and communicative platforms, the innovative use of image, sound and music to mobilize, have at times, been the sole focus in some media and academic circles. Some journalists and scholars celebrate this abundance of text/image as heralding a new form of social and political activism that is more participatory than the past. However, some cautionary and critical assessments of user-generated content have reminded us of the contradictory nature of online activities and have suggested that user-generated content is also a source of value in capitalist societies (Terranova 2000; Andrejevic 2008; Arvidsson 2005). For instance, Terranova argues:
The digital economy is an important area of experimentation with value and free cultural and affective labour. It is about specific forms of production (web-design, multimedia production, digital services, and so on), but is also about forms of labor we do not immediately recognize as such: chat, real-life stories, mailing lists, amateur newsletter, and so on. These types of cultural and technical labor are not produced by capitalism in any direct, cause-and-effect fashion; that is, they have not developed simply as an answer to the economic needs of capital. However, they have developed in relation to the expansion of the cultural industries and are part of a process of economic experimentation with the creation of monetary value out of knowledge/culture/affect (2000: 38). 
For Terranova, such digital activities are at the same time “voluntarily given and unwaged, enjoyed and exploited ” (ibid: 33). However, the critique of free labor is not the only critical analysis on offer when it comes to ‘creative labor’, the relationship between production and consumption and the nature of digital work and play (for an overview see Hesmondhalgh 2010). However, since digital activities of citizens across the globe, the Middle East included, are increasingly seen as ‘free labor’ (see, for example, Palmer’s [2012] account of the reliance of CNN on citizen journalists in Iran), it makes sense to engage with the origins of this concept. Terranova’s work is firmly located in the tendency which argues that information has become the main productive force. If information is the central commodity of the current phases of capitalism, it then follows, that ‘immaterial’ forms of labor (cognitive work and services) have become the dominant forms (if not the only one) of labor. Hardt and Negri, in particular, have argued that these new forms of labor necessitate a significant revision of Marx’s theory. As Hesmondhalgh points out:
Autonomist concepts of immaterial labor, affective labor and ‘precarity’ have been of increasing interest to critical commentators on contemporary work, including labor in the cultural and creative industries. The concept of immaterial labor has its origins in a series of papers in the journal Futur Antérieur by Michael Hardt, Maurizio Lazzarato, Antonio Negri and Paolo Virno in the early 1990s. The concept was there defined as “the labor that produces the information and cultural content of the commodity” (2010: 272).
The concept has been modified and expanded to include not only those that produce information and cultural content but any “that produces an immaterial good, such as a service, a cultural product, knowledge, or communication” (Negri cited in Hesmondhalgh ibid).
Immaterial labor, however, has a much longer history. The concept was used first in the early 19th century by Henry Storch. As Haug states, Storch was one of the economists that ‘were concerned with defusing Adam Smith’s notion that “the labour of some of the most respectable order in the society is […] unproductive” (2009: 177). Marx devotes an entire chapter to this question in Theories of Surplus Value Part 1. Marx himself doesn’t actually use the term, but makes a distinction between productive and unproductive labor. Productive labor, as it means in capitalist production, is defined as “wage-labour which, exchanged against the variable part of capital (the part of capital that is spent on wages), reproduces not only this part of the capital (or the value of its own labor-power), but in addition produces surplus-value for the capitalist” (Marx 1963: 152). That is, productive labor refers to labor which produces surplus value over and above the wages paid to the workforce. The worker exchanges her labor for a wage from capital, but that labor produces more value than what she is paid, and is hence the source of the capitalist’s profit. This is why capitalists try to push wages down (in order to increase their rate of profit) and why workers collective organizations resist this downward pressure. In contrast unproductive labor is defined as one that is not “exchanged with capital, but directly with revenue” (ibid: 157). This means that in the exchange between labor and payment, unproductive labor does not directly produce surplus value, but instead is labor exchanged for income. The distinction, as Marx further elaborates, is not to do with the nature of the product that is produced or the specific features of the labor, but rather “the social relations of production, within which the labor is realised” (ibid). Marx illustrates this distinction by giving an actor or a clown as an example. They are a productive laborer if they are in the service of a capitalist who takes away from their labor a lot more than he gives the actor or the clown as a wage. In contrast a tailor that goes to the house of the same capitalist to patch his trousers for him is an unproductive laborer, for what he produces is a use-value. That labor does not produce profit for that capitalist. “The former’s labour is exchanged with capital, the latter’s with revenue. The former’s labour produces a surplus-value; in the latter’s, revenue is consumed” (ibid). 
The form of labor and its product, Marx asserts, is not determined by the specific character of the labor but rather by the social relations of production. A seamstress, a cook, a cleaner, and so on, who work as the wage-laborer for a capitalist (and in doing so creates surplus value) inevitably must also perform the same tasks for themselves, however, they can only do so once they have labored ‘productively’ and earned enough to have a home to clean, food to cook and clothes to mend. Their ‘unproductive labor’ is dependent on them laboring ‘productively.’ On this basis Marx offers an expansive definition of labor, which not only includes an engineer or a factory worker, but also includes writer, actors, and musicians. They are productive laborers because they produce ideas, contents, performance, emotions, etc. that enriches entrepreneurs. That is, they create surplus value. Marx famously argued that the 
historical conditions of its [capitalism] existence are by no means given with the mere circulation of money and commodities. It can spring into life, only when the owner of the means of production and subsistence meets in the market with the free laborer selling his labor-power. And this one historical condition comprises a world’s history. Capital, therefore, announces from its first appearance a new epoch in the process of social production (Marx 1976: 274). 
Such a distinct approach is precisely why labor has occupied the most significant space in Marxism. This and the organization of labor is precisely why it was natural for Marx to place labor in the very centre stage of human productive activity. Human history is not defined only by technologies or by the division of labor, but also by different forms of ‘social relations of production’ that exist in each epoch. Because capitalism is an economic system driven by profit, the social relations of production determine when and where labor is productive or unproductive, on the basis of whether it directly contributes to the creation of surplus value—whether the capitalist exchanges a wage for labor which not only reproduces the value of that wage, but produces surplus value over and above it. 
Marx was concerned with the specific forms of material and symbolic production, the material as well as symbolic products and services. In his endeavor to understand and explain social relations he dismissed the idea of “immaterial labor.” The revival of the concept in the past two decades and its use even by those who insist that “labor is always material ” (Negri cited in Haug 2009: 177) can be understood not by reference to the origin of the concept but within the context of neoliberal ism. There is a rather disturbing overlap between the buzzwords of the business magazines and some left publications: New economy, digital economy, knowledge economy, prosumer, cognitive capitalism, etc. The main thrust of the arguments are well-rehearsed and well-known (Vercellone 2007; Negri, 1996). Novel forms of productive subjectivities are considered to be a key feature of the recent transformation of capitalism; cognitive aspects of living labor have seemingly become the main force of production and the major source of value creation (Lazzarator, 1996); and the separation between manual and mental labor is vanishing. Such perspectives then proceed to argue that the very same process, by producing or creating the new form or species of laborer that embodies the capacity to organize production independently from capital, threatens the command of capital or even renders it superfluous (Vercellone 2007; Lazzarato 1996; Sayer 2007). A significant element of this approach has been about the particular and peculiar features of the commodities that this new form of labor produces. Cognitive commodities, we are informed, are products for which the knowledge necessary for their production overshadows the manufacturing labor required for production. This in itself has major consequences for the cost structure of such peculiar products, namely the massive cost of production of the first copy and the marginal or zero cost of reproduction. 
This argument is not unfamiliar to the students of the political economy of media. Cultural commodities, argued Collins, Garnham and Locksley, share certain economic features which stem 
first from the fact that their essential quality from which their use-value derives is immaterial—it is in one form or another symbolic meaning which is merely carried by a material carrier such as celluloid, vinyl, or the waves of radio spectrum and a cathode ray tube. It is the message not the medium that provides value to the user and the message is immaterial or intangible (1988: 7). 
This immateriality also makes the cultural commodity non-rival; that is to say, it will not perish by the act of consumption. Another feature of cultural commodities is the marginal to zero-cost of reproduction. The cost of providing the same commodity to additional readers, listeners or viewers (that is broadcasting to another home, making an extra copy of the same record or additional paper or book), is very low indeed. 
Autonomous Marxists expand these characteristics to the whole economy in general and suggest that the introduction of the computer and the informationalization of production (and large sections of the economy) has transformed laboring activities and processes (for a critique of this position see Sayer 2007 and Camfield 2007). In this transformed knowledge-intensive economy, what is produced is immaterial products of labor that are costless to duplicate, non-rival, non-excludable, etc. This economy is seen to be marked by the logic of abundance and the end of scarcity (Vercellone 2007). However, the value form is undermined by the imposition of artificial scarcity such as copyright and integrated distribution. The reality is that the proponents of this approach share many mainstream claims about the new/digital/knowledge economy. Their saving grace seems to be their optimism for the potential of knowledge workers to make capital redundant and the radical transformation of society. They reframe the mainstream account of the role of knowledge and ITC in the economy and at the same time overstate the emancipatory potential of the current phase of capitalism. They underestimate the significance of ‘knowledge’ under industrial capitalism and overestimate the impact of computer on social relations and the conditions of production. This is, more or less, the framework that Terranova borrows and modifies to explain the main features of free labor. This labor is unpaid and exploited and creates surplus value for capitalists, and yet has an unparalleled mobilization potential (Terranova 2000).
The ‘cognitive capitalism’ thesis, expounded by Autonomous Marxists and others, not only exaggerates the transformation in the process of production—that is, fails to realize that symbolic commodities can’t instigate, regulate and manage the exchange in the market on their own—but they also, contrary to their promise, fail to be specific and substantiate their arguments. The issue of the exploitation of free digital labor is equally problematic. As Hesmondhalgh has pointed out, it is not really clear how the use of someone else’s effort for one’s own benefit is the same as exploitation, which is based very specifically in the creation of surplus value which is extracted from labor. That many areas of public life are reified and every surface, every minute, every garment, every roof, and other use-values are also potentially commodities, is beyond doubt. But for the idea of exploitation to have any analytical meaning, it has to be seen as an historical concept that is intended “to explain how capitalism was able to generate such massive surplus values and at the same time such immiseration” (Hesmondhalgh 2010: 274). In addition, new and seasoned political activists in Iran, Egypt, Tunisia, Turkey and elsewhere, young and old, might be surprised to learn that indeed, even in their effort to challenge capitalism and dictatorship, they were being controlled and exploited further. We might ask: isn’t the mainstream media coverage of the Occupy movements, or its coverage of the gathering and protests of people in the now celebrated squares across the world also exploitation? Doesn’t such coverage fill the pages, schedules and pockets of mainstream media? Is it not true that activists giving interviews to the papers or appearing on radio and television to put forward their arguments provide capitalist media with free ideas and content? How about the thousands that have marched in the streets? Indeed if any use (or abuse) of other people’s work, ideas, emotions and protests by capitalists can be labelled as exploitation, is there any space outside of this immaterial ‘cage’ of cognitive capitalism?
Let us explore these two dimensions, economic and political, of social media activities further. Can blogging be regarded as an exploited intellectual labor? Is the notion applicable to all online activities? To what extent is the immaterial turn global and, as Toscano asks, is “such a turn … truly worldwide? If so, in what ways is it subject to uneven and combined geographical development” (Toscano 2007: 9-10)? Blanket terms such as ‘immaterial turn’ and ‘information society’ fail to recognize societal multiplicity and the consequent variations of ‘development.’ Societies indeed do develop, but not with the same pace or depth, or even in the same direction. Much like the term culture (which always should prompt one to ask whose culture?) the idea of immaterial labor should also be followed by where and when. The experience of the Middle East itself, and indeed even the diversity of outcomes of the Arab revolts, is a clear indication of the importance of concrete analysis of concert situations. This is not to succumb to the beloved ‘plurality’ and ‘multiplicity’ of variants of postmodernism, but an urge to recognize the contradictions, unevenness, independence as well as the interdependency of social developments in relation to the external and internal dynamics. To say that Saudi Arabia and Sweden are both capitalist countries is certainly true and that fact should not be overlooked. Yet that statement of fact for social scientific analysis is as useful as the statement that ‘mouse and elephant are mammal’ for a biologist. Before considering some of the contradictions in the development and uses of social media in the Middle East let us examine the issue of exploitation of social media users and their level of independence from the state and the market from a different source and angle. 
Social media and free labor
In their contribution to this debate Christian Fuchs and Sebastian Sevignani draw on Marx’s writings on labor and alienation in the Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts to make a distinction between labor and work. They suggest that labor “is based on a fourfold alienation of the human being: the alienation from oneself, the alienation from the objects of labor (instruments and objects of labor) and the alienation from the created product” (2013: 257). It is important to note that they fail to mention the fourth type of alienation, the alienation of man from man, workers from workers, which Marx suggests is an “immediate consequence of man’s alienation from the product of his work, his vital activities, and his species-being” (1977: 83). In their attempt to apply this distinction to social media, Fuchs and Sevignani also argue that the users of social media platform are indeed coerced to use them. This coercion, they insist, is not the same as what other workers face, which is to die of hunger if they don’t ‘voluntarily’ sell their labor to capitalists. But “rather a social form of coercion that threatens the users with isolation and social disadvantages” (ibid). This makes Facebook users unpaid workers. In this digital field the instruments of labor “are the platform and the brains of its human users.” The users not only don’t own or control the platform, but also by entering into ‘voluntary’ contract with Facebook give those who control the means of production of human experiences (in this instance) to use ideas/experiences/generated data for their own commercial benefit. Fuchs and Sevignani dismiss many of the well-rehearsed myths around Facebook and point out that in a usually one-sided emphasis on the use-value of Facebook (and its benefit for their users) there is no or little mention of the exchange-value that is extracted by the owners and shareholders. “Facebook labour creates commodities and profits. It is therefore productive work. It is however unpaid work and in this respect shares characteristics of other irregular work forces, especially houseworkers and slaves, who are also unpaid.” The working condition for this unpaid labor is rather different, but “100% of their labour time is surplus labour time, which allows capitalists to generate extra-surplus value and extra-profits” (ibid: 262).
But how is this surplus value generated? Fuchs and Sevignani start from the well-known argument (again) that cultural commodities have dual character and operate in two markets and write: 
We can therefore speak of the double character of Facebook’s use-value: on the one hand, users produce use-values for themselves and others, they create a social relation between users and public visibility. On the other hand, users produce use-values for capital, i.e. targeted advertising space for the advertising industry. For Facebook, both use-values are instrumental for achieving exchange value, i.e. selling to the advertising industry what it wants (ad space) and what is produced by the users. The dual character of use-value stems from the circumstance that the Facebook product/use-value is informational: it can be exchanged with money and at the same time stay under the control of the users (ibid: 260).
This analysis seems rather straightforward. However, such framing of the activities on digital labor, values, control and the condition of production in social media, (leaving aside the authors confusion over use-value and exchange-value) raises some interesting questions. The main focus of Fuchs and Sevignani, as the title of their article clearly indicates, is digital labor and work. Yet in their contribution the very idea of digital is used interchangeably with informational. Not all immaterial goods are digital and not all kinds of ‘immaterial labor’ are ‘digital labor’ or ‘digital work.’ The conflation of all ‘informational,’ intangible, immaterial and symbolic goods with ‘digital’ will only add to the confusion over the nature of labor, digital or otherwise. The production of immaterial goods has a much longer history than digital manipulation of the same intangible products and more. 
Fuchs and Sevignani’s analysis of the audience as a commodity—and that all users time on Facebook is ‘productive’ labor—is based on Dallas Smythe’s notion of the media commodity form. Smythe had argued that the crucial function of the media was to sell audiences to advertisers, and that the act of consuming media was a form of unpaid labor and what this unpaid labor of audiences consisted of was to “learn to buy particular ‘brands’ of consumer goods, and to spend their income accordingly. In short, they work to create the demand for advertised goods which is the purpose of the monopoly capitalist advertisers” (1977: 6). It is not just that Smythes’ approach loses all connection to political struggle (Hesmondhalgh 2010) but also as Garnham argues it 
misunderstands the function of commodity form as an abstraction within Marxist economic theory, and thus neglects the relationship between specific forms of the commodity, in this case the audience and the commodity form in general. As a result his theory lacks any sense of contradiction, failing to account for the function of those cultural commodities directly exchanged, failing to account for the role of the State, failing sufficiently to elaborate the function for capital of advertising itself and, perhaps most crucially of all, failing to relate the process of audience production by the mass media to determinants of class and to class struggle (Garnham 1990: 29). 
Furthermore, in their critique of the ‘cognitive capitalism’ approach, Fuchs and Sevignani highlight that immaterial labor is hardly outside the sphere of existing capitalist social relations. But by labelling all social media users (or to be precise Facebook users) as unwaged, exploited and alienated workers, the degree of inequality and unevenness in ‘exchange’ is simply brushed aside. The law of the market is of course based on the very idea of inequality of exchange between labor and capital. Indeed if exchange was equal or one of equivalents, there would be no surplus. However, this concern is simply not limited to the inequality between Facbook shareholders and users, but also between productive laborers (Facebook employees) and unproductive laborers (those who can only be on Facebook after having worked productively to pay for their accommodation, food, bills and computer and internet access). A general statement that there exists “a class relationship between users and non-owners and stockowners at the heart of Facebook” (ibid: 258) is not sufficient for any meaningful class analysis. 
In addition, the general terming of users as ‘non-owners’ disguises the variations and diversities among the so-called ‘unwaged workers’ of Facebook. All Facebook users are equal in as much as they can be labelled as ‘non-owners.’ But some of the Facebook users are more equal than others. There are commercial users (and not owners) that exploit the platform for their own benefit/gain/profits. There are users (celebrities) that are nationally and internationally recognized. Their fame is there to extract ‘rent’ and to promote the very product that they have turned into. There are users (again not owners) that have pages that cannot be friended but can only be ‘liked.’ Not all of these users can be said to be subject to the same ‘class relations.’ The cleaners of Facebook offices in Dubai, Sao Polo, Mexico City, Seoul, Hyderabad, Buenos Aires, as well as in Paris and New York, cannot be said to be subject to the same class relations, and exploited as ‘non-owners’ like Justin Bieber, Rihanna, Lady Gaga, Coca Cola and YouTube (just some of the top pages on Facebook). Indeed we have to recognize not only the varying composition of intangible products (digital or otherwise), and varying composition of capital (cognitive and material), but also varying composition of ‘users.’ If the theory of ‘immaterial labor’ offers very little insight about the different kinds of paid work that the cognitive capitalism approach tries to lump together, the labeling of all user generated content as free labor and all users as unwaged, exploited and alienated labor suffers from a rather stylized image of users as a singular worker. This homogenization of users is as problematic as attempts to brush aside the heterogeneity of working class formations and experiences.
The problem that surrounds the idea of ‘unwaged’ or ‘free labor’ will not go away even if we narrow down the definition of symbolic products and users. Let us assume for a moment that we only address the question of user generated content in relation to ordinary, non-commercial, non-famous individuals on Facebook. Hesmondhalgh points out “there has been a tendency to bandy about the phrase ‘free labor’ as if it describes one huge, interconnected aspect of inequality and injustice” (2010: 277). He rightly points out that only very limited numbers of cultural producers have produced simply to gain financially from their ‘labor.’ Take, for example, large number of people who practise music or football or basketball. Such practises contribute to training the future workforce and as such are crucial in making available a reserve army of workers in these fields. Should people get paid for such practises on the basis that these talents are/will be exploited by businesses (ibid)? And how should we feel about shopping and our time and energy which is spent on walking to the shops, searching for goods, testing, selecting and purchasing them? Closer to ‘home,’ we might reflect on how we should feel about academic publishing. Those who write journal articles, book chapters, and monographs are usually generating content for commercial publishers. Can we label academics as unwaged laborers in this very instance? What should we call the journal editors then: ‘foreman of capitalist publishing?’ 
To consider wage as the only meaningful reward in such cases, as Hesmondhalgh warns “would run the danger of internalising capitalism’s own emphasis on commodification” (ibid: 278). If the general idea of immaterial labor is connected and inspired by the neoliberal  fantasy of dematerialization of the economy, the unintentional consequences of the discussion of user-generated-content as unwaged and exploited labor is that everything of (potential use) value should have a price and a financial reward in wage form. 
Instead of seeing independent production of content generated by users as exploitation, it is possible to frame these forms of activities in the context of the narratives of intellectuals. This perspective allows us to recognize and pay attention to the division of labor in symbolic production without falling into the trap of internalizing and legitimizing capitalist ‘morality.’ At the same time it also allows agency for media producers while providing us with ground to critically assess the performance and content of media. This is how Nicholas Garnham has tried to address the problem of the relationship between knowledge producers and knowledge. He defines the specialist in symbolic production as intellectuals and divides them into three groups: those whose “symbolic power, derives from monopoly control over the production of knowledge and cultural legitimation;” those that “may be defined functionally as information workers, those whose specialized position within the division of labor is the manipulation of symbolic form;” and finally the group that “may be defined normatively as a vocation, as representatives of a critical, emancipatory tradition appealing to universal values” (2000: 84-5).
The question of intellectuals was also central to Gramsci’s argument about intellectual work, in which he stressed that everyone has an intellect and uses it but not all are intellectuals by their social function. Gramsci offered a very expansive definition of intellectual labor: “there is no human activity from which every form of intellectual participation can be excluded” so that everyone “carries on some form of intellectual activity …, participates in a particular conception of the world, has a conscious line of moral conduct, and therefore contributes to sustain a conception of the world or to modify it, that is, to bring into being new modes of thought” (1971: 5). He classically identified two types of intellectuals—traditional and organic. Traditional intellectuals are those who think of themselves as autonomous and independent of the dominant social group and are so regarded by the general population. Organic intellectuals develop together with the dominant social group, the ruling class, and constitute their thinking and organizing element. Such people are produced by the educational system to perform a function for the dominant social group and it is through this group that the ruling class maintains its hegemony over the rest of society. Gramsci further suggested that in order for any kind of counterhegemonic position to grow and challenge the taken-for-granted common sense that prevailed, both traditional and organic intellectuals needed to ‘change sides’ while the working class movement had to produce its own ‘organic intellectuals.’ Any ideological struggle for social change required not only consciousness-raising but consciousness transformation while the creation of a socialist consciousness would develop out of actual working lives (Gramsci 1971: 5-23) 

Following Sartre’s distinction between ‘intellectuals’ and ‘technicians of practical knowledge,’ Edward Said also famously divided intellectuals into two broad camps, amateur and professional. Said himself identified with the former, one of whose tasks, as he put it, is to “raise embarrassing questions, to confront orthodoxy and dogma (rather than produce them), to be someone who cannot easily be co-opted by governments or corporations, and whose raison d’etre is to represent all those people, and issues that are routinely swept under the rug” (cited in Garnham 2000: 87). If the intellectual sphere is thus not confined to a small elite but rather is something which is grounded in everyday life, and indeed should ‘speak’ to and about that life in language that all could understand, then Gramsci is right to suggest that “the mode of being of the new intellectual can no longer consist in eloquence … but in active participation in practical life, as constructor, organizer, ‘permanent persuader’ and not just a simple orator …” (1971: 10). Social media equally contains not only a wide range of ‘users’ (consumers) but producers of ideas and contents. However, as has been suggested elsewhere (Sreberny and Khiabany 2007), the online environment is not exclusively the stomping ground of traditional intellectuals who position themselves as independent. These producers (productive or unproductive, in the Marxist sense) are representative of their class and of knowledge. Their level of ‘independence’ (as producers) is varied, historically shifting, and is ‘dependent’ on not only the material resources but also on their location in geography and in politics. 
Critiques of uncritical accounts of the role of information technologies also needs to take into consideration what Williams has called ‘uncontrollable effect.’ Williams always insisted on finding ways to democratize culture and cultural production. At the heart of this attempt—and long before anyone started playing around with the words producer/consumer—he argued for access to cultural resources which allowed everyone to be both producer and consumer. Williams also pointed at alternative uses (and regulation) of technologies. In the case of television in particular, he suggested while it is possible to discuss the social history of broadcasting on its own, “it is unrealistic to extract from it another and perhaps more decisive process, through which, in particular economic situations, a set of scattered technical devices became an applied technology and then a social technology” (1974: 18). In other words, the level of one’s independence as a producer is shaped by the broader material realities that structure, regulate and circulate symbolic production. However, it is also in the same book that we read the memorable sentence: “For there was no way to teach a man to read the Bible which did not also enable him to read the radical press. A controlled intention became an uncontrolled effect” (134-135). In the case of social media it is not just the paradox of the collapse of productive and unproductive labor into one (i.e. the unproductive labor of users contributing to the commercial success of media companies), the contradiction between the original design (controlled intention) and the use of technology (uncontrollable effect), and the obvious and stark interplay between public and private, etc that are confronting us. The recent events in the Middle East and the much celebrated alternative uses of social media provide a clear example of the “uncontrolled effect” of new technologies. Yet a closer look at the case of production and ‘regulation’ of user generated content in the Middle East provides us with more evidence of contradictory processes of independent production.

Technologies of liberation and/or otherwise
The uprising and revolts that shook Iran in the aftermath of the electoral coup in 2009, and the revolts in Tunisia and Egypt that toppled the governments in these countries in 28 and 18 days respectively, had three significant similarities. First, the Arab revolutions like the uprising in Iran in 2009 were, in the first place, revolts against dictatorships and in direct opposition to the ruling regimes. These uprisings, like many such movements against despotism, were also marked with demonstrations and the visible participation of young people in the uprisings. Second, all three happened at the time in which, unlike 1979 (the time of Iranian Revolution), the world is not divided into two camps, but is confronted with a US hegemony and globalization of financial capital. And finally, they all happened at the time in which advances in communication technologies, and in particular the internet, have allowed for a much faster circulation and dissemination of information. Hence the constant association of these revolts with Twitter, Facebook, YouTube, etc. 
Indeed one of the main explanations emerging immediately after the Iranian uprising of 2009 and the Arab Revolutions revolves around new technologies. Terms such as Twitter Revolution, WikiLeaks Revolution, Facebook Revolution, etc., by associating these revolts with new technologies, not only pointed out the potentials of new technologies but more significantly, claimed that such tools were the main engine and agents of social change in the region. This is certainly not an entirely false explanation. Imaginative use of new technologies to disseminate information, to focus the collective minds of population, to break down the barrier of censorship, and to pave the way for the emergence of a ‘public,’ was real and not simply a figment of western journalists imagination. Many activists in Iran and the Arab World articulated and forwarded such interpretations of events in the region. 
However, if a single incident, or a technology, or a revelation about the glamorous life style of the ruling elites can spark a revolution, then we have to demonstrate that in every context and location the same phenomena should produce identical results. In that case we are confronted with a question of why the desperate act of Mohamed Bouazizi ignited the Tunisian revolution but the repeat of the same act in Algeria could not? Similarly an explanation which puts new technologies at the heart of the debate about the why and how of the Arab Revolutions not only has to demonstrate that the Arab Revolutions would not have happened if there was no Twitter, Facebook, YouTube or WikiLeaks, but also has to explain why the imaginative use of the very same technologies failed to produce the same result in Iran. These terms of course vanished as soon as the big media corporations left the squares of major cities in the Arab World. The buzzwords had served their purpose, at least for the mainstream media. No one has used these terms to describe the ongoing struggle in these countries since the fall of Mubarak and Ben Ali (see Poell and van Dijk’s contribution in this volume on the use of social media in relation to journalistic independence).
As Ahmed Saleh and Nadine Wahab, administrators of “I Am Khaled Said” page on Facebook, have argued “all of the administrators of the Facebook pages and even the political activists were surprised that the demonstrators continued protesting all over Egypt on January 26th and beyond, without any Facebook page calling for it or organizing it”. “The administrators”, they point out, “were now on the receiving end of the news” (2011: 243). It might have been exciting for many journalists (and academics) to offer an inflated assessment of all things ‘virtual,’ however, the ‘material’ element, thousands of people who gathered, who occupied, who fought the police and the army, and those who died, were not an online profile or a hashtag. The fact is technological determinist perspectives are also apolitical and ahistorical, failing to consider the wealth of activities by various players in various locations and over the course of decades which paved the ground for the eruptions and uprising. These perspectives, also despite claiming to fluidity, liquidity, flow, etc, are too rigid in recognising concrete political and social circumstances. However, such terms at the same time had another role to play. The Western focus on social media, Saleh and Wahab speculate, was “probably motivated by the desire to take credit for the Arab Revolution, given that the West is credited for the invention.” Hence the focus on social media “rather than the more important, stronger and more direct effect of the injustice perpetuated by the dictators sponsored by Western regimes” (ibid). 
It was famously reported that during Iranian uprising in 2009 the US government had asked Twitter to postpone their scheduled maintenance service because of the alleged significance of the role of Twitter for the Iranian activists. Such attempts at taking credit for the uprisings and promoting the myths of “technologies of freedom” (Sola Pool 1983) were being made at the time that not only the very same technologies (or alternative uses of them) were being suppressed by the US government, but also that the US policy was contributing to the censorship of the internet in Iran. It was not until Obama delivered his famous YouTube message for Iranian New Year on March 20th 2012, and when he asked Iranian leaders to bring down the ‘electronic curtain’ of censorship, that he promised to lift sanctions that disconnect Iranians from the Internet. The tragedy is not just that the US government was/is contributing to that ‘electronic curtain,’ but rather hypocritically trying to ‘help’ Iranians to break free from government at the time that the US economic sanctions were making the Iranian people more dependent on the Iranian regime (as was also the case in Iraq). US sanctions threaten the livelihood and the health of the Iranian people, but at least, thanks to the US government generosity, they could access Google+!
The US government’s endorsement of the perceived role of the technologies in the Iranian uprising and Obama’s promise to help bring down the ‘electronic curtain’ (a play on a cold war term) further promotes the myth that under dictatorship the online is the very opposite of ‘hard-line’ (conservative factions in the Islamic Republic of Iran). As far as Iran is concerned and in the context of the war on terror the “visibility of bloggers in mainstream international media cannot be solely attributed to technological developments. Nor can this hypervisibility be reduced to the usual narrative of lack of freedom of speech in Iran” (Shakhsari 2011: 7). For Shakhsari the rise and proliferation of Iranian bloggers outside Iran is a result of the fact that “the knowledge production about Iran has become a lucrative business for those who provide expertise in different capacities, from testimonials in media, books and human rights reports, to research and collection of information in think tanks, state and private intelligence firms and universities.” As such the figure of an Iranian blogger outside of Iran, therefore, is a neoliberal  subject “that acts as an entrepreneur, who is responsible for his/her own economic well-being and markets him/herself as the source of valuable information” (ibid: 11).

The pressure to provide information about stories and situations that western media have been unable to report first hand has also ‘allowed’ for a far greater reliance on user generated content by big media companies. In her analysis of the CNN coverage of the Iranian uprising Palmer suggest that the company “simultaneously denigrates and depends” on its iReporters, “especially when covering a political uprising.” She suggests that the professional journalists’ denigration of their amateur counterparts, is a sign of “anxious effort at maintaining the professional monopoly on meaning itself in an era where traditional journalism is indeed in crisis” (2012: 369).

Further contradiction can be seen in the operation of the US based internet companies in the global south. These companies are rapidly expanding their operation in the Global South. The figures provided by Schiller are illuminating. The number of users of these services in 2010 were as follow: Skype, 560 million; Facebook 500 million; Microsoft, 789 million; Yahoo, 633 million; and Google had registered more than a billion searches each day by 2009. The share of the Global South in some respect is also fascinating. As Schiller argues “Facebook is visited by 92% of the Internet population in Turkey, 87% in Indonesia, and (merely) 67% in the United States” (2011: 932). By September 2013 Facebook claimed over 1 billion users. The uprisings in the Middle East and the hype about the role of social media have certainly been good for the likes of Facebook and Twitter. Yet, as many have recorded, (Saleh and Wahab 2011; Ghonim 2012) Facebook had shut some pages, including “I am Khaled Said” for violating Facebook terms and conditions. In some cases the activists in the region, Egypt included, not only had to break the firewall of the state but also of Facebook (for other examples of dependencies of activists on mainstream structures see Kreiss in this collection). For obvious reasons it is impossible for activists to use their real identity to administer political pages on Facebook, which is yet another violation of terms and conditions. Activists who fight against tyranny have to bypass the laws of the very same company which would like to take credit for the struggle against dictatorship. 
The above contradictions are to some extent ‘external,’ that is mostly (not entirely) related to how the role of social media was perceived, framed, explained and ‘influenced’ by/in the West. The sanctions, the filters, the commercial interests, terms and conditions of the US based digital companies, etc. have in fact contributed to the containment of the potential of those technologies, but more importantly, of people. These all acted as significant barriers to truly independent activitism. The ‘internal’ contradictions are also as interesting and as complex, with specific consequences for the level of independent activities and voices. One significant outcome of the myth of the role of social media in the Iranian uprising was to confuse, or perhaps even substitute, media for the movement. “You are the media,” was one of the claims of the so-called Green Movement. Yet at the same time that activists were being confined to the realm of small media, many of the well-known figures appeared on mainstream media as the voice of the movement. What was brushed aside was the historical fact that how individuals are organized as intellectual is by definition a social process. Who gets noticed, who gets to speak, and who is allowed to ‘represent’ the public, is never given. The same people also controlled the organized networks, including the Facebook pages of the ‘Green Movement.’ The Iranian uprising in 2009 grew out of the division ‘above,’ when the Iranian state tried to entice people to the poll and give the electoral game in Iran a democratic gloss. The revolt against the “electoral coup” certainly went further. However radicalization of the slogans and demands were not matched with the expansion of the revolt. The leadership of the movement (the two other presidential candidates) had no interest in challenging the Islamic state which they had contributed to building. Once they retreated they took their resources and networks with them. 
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